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ABSTRACT
Wireless networking relies on a fundamental building block,
neighbor discovery (ND). The nature of wireless communi-
cations, however, makes attacks against ND easy: An adver-
sary can simply replay or relay (wormhole) packets across
the network and mislead disconnected nodes into believing
that they communicate directly. Such attacks can compro-
mise the overlying protocols and applications. Proposed
methods in the literature seek to secure ND, allowing nodes
to verify they are neighbors. However, they either rely on
specialized hardware or infrastructure, or offer limited secu-
rity. In this paper, we address these problems, designing a
practical and secure neighbor verification protocol for con-
strained Wireless Sensor networks (WSNs). Our scheme re-
lies on estimated distance between nodes and simple geomet-
ric tests, and it is fully distributed. We prove our protocol is
secure against the classic 2-end wormhole attack. Moreover,
we provide a proof-of-concept implementation with off-the-
shelf WSN equipment: Cricket motes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.2.1 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Network Architecture and Design —Wireless
communication
General Terms
Security, Design, Experimentation
1. INTRODUCTION
Neighbor discovery (ND) provides an essential function-
ality for wireless devices, that is to discover other devices
that they can communicate directly through the wireless
medium. This is a fundamental building block for wireless
networking, routing being the most essential in the context
of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Nonetheless, the na-
ture of wireless communications makes it easy to abuse ND.
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Consider two sensor nodes A and B, out of each other’s com-
munication range, and an adversary that controls two relay
nodesM andW , within range of A and B, respectively. The
adversarial node M receives packets from A, relays them to
W , and then retransmits them to B. The result is that,
through a false link, A and B are misled to believe that
they are neighbors, although they are not. Consequently,
such an adversary can control the victims’ communication,
or more generally, he can control multi-hop communication
by shortening communication paths and manipulating other
system’s operations.
The importance of “wormhole” or “relaying” attacks in
wireless networks has been identified in the literature. The
importance of these attacks is due to the fact that it is easy
for an adversary to act at the physical layer without any
node compromise or possession of cryptographic keys. Se-
cure neighbor verification thwarts this attack, essentially,
by identifying as neighbors only those nodes that are indeed
neighbors. However, a neighbor verification protocol does
not have to be complete, i.e. to discover and verify all ac-
tual neighbors. This is, most notably, due to the jamming
attack that the adversary can always perform to prevent the
discovery of legitimate neighbors.
As corroborated by a recent impossibility result for a broad
class of secure wireless ND protocols (run by two correct
nodes in the presence of the wormhole), it is quite challeng-
ing, in general, to verify communication neighborhood, i.e.,
to discover other nodes that can directly communicate with
a considered node [12]. Hence, in practice, secure ND proto-
cols often approximate it with physical neighborhood, where
nodes prove they are in vicinity of each other.
A number of solutions to secure ND have been proposed
thus far. However, as we show in Section 2, virtually all of
them are not generally applicable to WSN, either because
they need specialized hardware, or they rely on the presence
of an external trustworthy infrastructure, or because they
are based on assumptions that limit their applicability.
In this paper, we design a powerful and secure neighbor
verification protocol that adheres to the limited hardware
capabilities of WSN, as it is demonstrated by our implemen-
tation. In our protocol, each node estimates its distance to
the other nodes it can communicate with through a single
hop. Then, nodes exchange information about their esti-
mates. Next, a series of simple geometric tests is run by
each node over the local neighborhood view it has obtained,
in order to detect topology distortions created by wormhole
attacks. Only those nodes that successfully pass the tests
are verified to be actual communication neighbors.
Our results show that these tests are highly effective. To
create false links, the adversary needs to carefully adjust
the distance between victims by selecting the appropriate
delays introduced when relaying messages. The adjustment
is based on the location of the motes. Without centimeter-
precision knowledge of location of victim nodes, which is
hard to obtain, the adversary has only a negligible chance
to create false links. Even with that knowledge, we show
that the adversary cannot create any false links with a 2-end
attack. We also show, using simulations, that the number of
false links that an adversary can create with a k-end worm-
hole is highly limited. The latter results are omitted from
this version of the paper due to space limitations, and we
refer the reader to the associated technical report [15].
Our solution is independent of the technology that wire-
less devices use to estimate their distance to each other.
Nonetheless, our proof-of-concept implementation relies on
off-the-shelf WSN equipment: Cricket motes that are ca-
pable of ultra-sound (US) ranging. However, the simple
ranging protocol that is implemented in Cricket motes is
replaced with our secure ranging protocol, which is tailored
to our security requirements. Overall, our contributions in
this paper are: (i) a secure ND scheme tailored for WSN, (ii)
the provable security1 of the protocol against a 2-end worm-
hole, (iii) the implementation and experimental evaluation
of the protocol with existing WSN hardware.
2. RELATED WORK
A number of secure neighbor discovery schemes have been
proposed in the literature. We briefly survey schemes that
are not generally applicable to WSN, because of their special
hardware requirements or dependance on additional infras-
tructure. Then, we discuss in details the applicable schemes
and compare them with our proposal.
The scheme proposed in [4] detects wormhole attacks us-
ing directional antennas, that are not common for WSN. RF-
fingerprinting, i.e., recognizing a wireless transceiver based
on unique features of the signals it generates, is considered
in [13]. However, the signal analysis that this scheme per-
forms is not feasible for a typical sensor mote radio receiver.
Geographical packet leashes [5] rely on location information
to estimate the distance between the nodes, and thus pre-
vent wormhole attacks. However, node knowledge of secure
location is hard to obtain in many settings. In particular,
secure localization schemes for WSN require additional in-
frastructure such as a number of location-aware beacons [16].
This type of additional infrastructure is also the basis of a
wormhole prevention scheme proposed in [11].
Another method to estimate the distance between wire-
less nodes uses the message time-of-flight (through the US
[14], or RF medium [5][17]) between two nodes. US-based
distance measurement is not secure in general: An adversary
can decrease the distance by relaying a slow US signal over
a fast relay link. The RF-based method is also problematic,
especially in the context of sensor networks, given the light-
speed propagation of RF waves. To precisely estimate the
distance, a nanosecond precision clock is required, that is
well beyond the capabilities of existing sensor motes.
Nevertheless, it is possible to measure the RF time-of-
flight with the best precision available, as proposed in [9] for
1Except an arguably infeasible case where the adversary has
to mount its relay node on top of a victim.
generic wireless networks, in [3] for 802.11, or [1] for WSN.
Actually, our scheme utilizes this method (in the synchro-
nization phase). The microsecond precision clock available
on sensor motes allows us to thwart store-and-forward worm-
hole attacks, and to prevent the adversary from creating very
long false links. However, false links spanning over few hops
are not detected. Hence, our protocol also includes more
sophisticated defense mechanisms.
Two centralized approaches that rely on distance measure-
ments [18] or only connectivity information [2] are proposed.
Both are essentially implementable on WSNs, but have some
drawbacks. The former visualizes the network and requires
user interaction to localize the wormholes, limiting its appli-
cability. The latter detects wormhole attacks based on the
abnormal values of some statistics of the connectivity graph,
but this requires assumptions about the expected values of
these statistics. Moreover, no information about the loca-
tion of the detected wormhole is provided.
A distributed scheme that relies only on connectivity in-
formation detects wormhole attacks by checking for forbid-
den structures in the connectivity graph [7]. A forbidden
structure is a graph that is very unlikely to be observed as a
subgraph of a legitimate connectivity graph, but that often
appears under the attack: The precise form of these struc-
tures depends on the connectivity pattern. This method
demonstrates good performance (specifically high detection
rates) for dense networks when evaluated (with simulations)
under theoretical connectivity patterns (unit-disk (UDG),
quasi-UDG and the TOSSIM models). However, the scheme
is not investigated in a real deployment, with a high irregu-
larity of antenna patterns [20]. Under such conditions, the
authors of [7] propose to empirically estimate the forbidden
structures in an attacker-free part of the network. However,
it might be impossible, or prohibitively expensive, to verify
that a part of the network is wormhole-free. Besides, a part
of the network does not necessary represent the entire net-
work accurately. Furthermore, the security of this scheme is
not analyzed under k-end relay attacks.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a static WSN where nodes (motes), A, B, . . . .,
are distributed throughout a field. For the sake of simplicity,
our analysis assumes nodes are deployed on a plane, but
our protocol can easily be extended for nodes deployed in
three dimensions. Nodes are correct, i.e., follow the protocol.
The distance from A to B as measured by A, is denoted by
dAB , whereas |AB| denotes the actual (Euclidean) distance
between nodes (or points) A and B.
Each node is equipped with a microsecond precision clock,
and two network interfaces: a radio-frequency (RF) and a
sound (typically, ultra-sound (US)) interface. R is the range
of the US technology, s = 342m/s is the speed of sound, and
c = 3 × 108m/s is the speed of light. We call two nodes, A
and B, neighbors if and only if they are in physical proximity
of each other, i.e., |AB| < R, and they can communicate
directly in a symmetric way using both US and RF.
Nodes can perform cryptographic operations with a sym-
metric key K: encryption (EK{.}), message authentication
code (MACK{.}), and hash or one-way functions (H{.})
computations. They can also generate fresh random nonces.
Every pair of nodes, A, B, running a ND protocol shares a
symmetric key, KAB .
Adversary Model We are only concerned with external
adversaries that cannot compromise correct nodes or their
cryptographic keys. The adversary controls a number of
relay nodes we also term as wormhole ends. The relay nodes
are connected through an out-of-band relay link, over which
information propagates with speed equal to the speed of
light, c. Every relay node is equipped with one radio (RF)
interface, and exactly one ultra-sound (US) interface with
an omnidirectional transceiver.
We assume the adversary is sophisticated enough to relay
messages on a per-symbol basis (i.e. messages are relayed at
the physical layer and the adversary is not limited to store-
and-forward relaying). The processing time at wormhole
ends is considered to be below 1µ second. As the recep-
tion time of an US message is estimated with microsecond
precision, such relaying delay has a negligible effect on US-
based distance measurements. This is so when the attacker
relays US signals over short relay links. However, long relay
links (above 300m) introduce a non-negligible delay (a few
microseconds) to relayed messages.
Messages (both RF and US) eavesdropped by a relay node
can be selectively discarded, modified, delayed, or replicated
before being relayed by another node. The adversary can
also inject new messages into the network, but it is com-
putationally bounded and unable to mount cryptanalytic
attacks or to guess fresh nonces.
4. THE SCHEME
In the initialization phase of the network, when nodes dis-
cover their neighbors, there is no guarantee that the nodes
that appear to be neighbors are indeed so. Our secure neigh-
bor verification protocol will address this, relying on the
previously established security associations (SAs) using a
key establishment protocol (e.g.,[21]). The protocol is in-
tended to run after most of the WSN nodes are deployed
and SAs are established. If the network topology changes
significantly, as the operator relocates nodes or deploys new
ones, the protocol is re-run. The protocol consists of the
following phases:
(i) Ranging Given a list of potential neighbors, every
node calculates its distance to all of its neighbors using our
US-based ranging protocol.
(ii)Neighbor Table Exchange After the ranging phase,
every node shares with each of its neighbors (in an authen-
ticated manner) the neighbor table, including the distances
calculated in the ranging phase. Then, each node creates
a table that includes the distances between its neighbors in
addition to its own distance to its neighbors.
(iii) Link Verification The extended neighbor table is
examined by a number of security tests. As a result, each
link is verified in the case it passes specific tests. Otherwise,
it is marked as an unverifiable link.
The protocol operates with a set of parameters adjusted
based on the physical characteristics of the communication
channel. ǫsym is the upper bound on the amount of link
asymmetry error. ǫquad is the upper bound on the error of
determining if four points are part of a quadrilateral on a
plane (e.g., being a tetrahedron). Finally, ǫsync is the bound
on propagation delay estimation error.
4.1 Ranging
A three-step ranging protocol is run once by every node
in the network. The first step of the ranging phase, that is
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Figure 1: Ranging Protocol. The initiator node A
is ranging its neighbors B and C.
performed over RF, allows the initiator node, A, to synchro-
nize itself with its neighbors (with microsecond precision).
In this step, nodes do not adjust their clocks after synchro-
nization; rather, the difference between clock readings at A
and at a neighbor B is determined, which will be used in
security tests and distance measurement. The second step,
performed over US, is the actual ranging. This operation
is done simultaneously for all neighbors, by broadcasting an
ultra-sound message. The last step, acknowledgement, final-
izes the ranging and secures the synchronization. Figure 1
illustrates one execution of the ranging protocol between
node A and two of its neighbors B and C. Next, we focus
on explaining communication between A and B in detail.
Synchronization The initiator, A, sends via RF a REQ
message to B, and it records the time of transmission as
tAREQ. The REQ message contains an encrypted freshly
generated nonce, NrB , which is different for every neighbor
B and is used to authenticate B’s response. It also contains
the hash function value of another fresh nonce Ns, used in
the ranging phase, which is the same for all neighbors of A.
The whole message, including the header, is authenticated
with a MAC using the shared secret key between A and B.
Having received such a message, if the MAC is correct and
NrB has not been seen or generated as a nonce before, node
B records the time of reception tBREQ and replies with the
REP message, which contains the nonce, NrB , while record-
ing the time of sending as tBREP . When A receives the REP
message, it also records the time of reception, tAREP . This
procedure is repeated for each neighbor of A.
A
RF
−−→ B : 〈REQ,EKAB{N
r
B}, H(N
s),MACKAB{.}〉
A : tAREQ := Sending time of REQ.
B : tBREQ := Reception time of REQ.
B : If NrB is fresh and MAC is correct, then:
B
RF
−−→ A : 〈REP,NrB〉
B : tBREP := Sending time of REP .
A : tAREP := Reception time of REP .
Ranging The initiator, A, broadcasts the ranging mes-
sage RNG over US and records the time of transmission
as tARNG. The message consists of a single bit 1, as the
preamble, concatenated with the nonce Ns generated in the
synchronization step. Every neighbor B, upon receiving this
message, records the time as tBRNG and the subsequent bits
(which is the nonce) as NsB .
A
US
−−→ ∗ : 〈1||Ns〉
A : tARNG := Sending time of RNG
B : tBRNG := Reception time of RNG
B : NsB := Received RNG nonce
Acknowledgement To conclude the ranging operation,
the initiator, A, sends an ACK message to those neighbors
that have replied correctly in the synchronization step.
A : If B has sent correct REP , then:
A
RF
−−→ B : 〈ACK,Ns, tAREQ, t
A
REP , t
A
RNG,MACKAB{.}〉
B : If MAC is correct and Ns = NsB , and
|(tAREP − t
A
REQ)− (t
B
REP − t
B
REQ)| < ǫsync:
dBA := ((t
B
RNG − t
B
REQ)− (t
A
RNG − t
A
REQ))× s
The ACK message contains Ns, to bind it to the ear-
lier transmitted REQ and RNG messages, and three time-
stamps, tAREQ, t
A
REP and t
A
RNG, that allow B to assure if the
synchronization was done correctly, i.e., no delay beyond the
propagation delay (which is below 1µs for RF communica-
tion at the range we are considering) was introduced while
the messages were in transit. Node B also checks if the re-
ceived nonce in the ranging phase, NsB , is equal to N
s (that
was sent by A). If the checks are successful, B uses the
time-stamps to calculate its distance to A. To provide au-
thentication and integrity, the ACK message includes also
the MAC over all its content.
4.2 Neighbor Table Exchange
The neighbor table NTA, constructed by every node A in
the network, contains the identifiers of its neighbors that
were previously properly ranged and its distance to them.
Neighbors for which ranging failed are not included in the
table. The table is broadcasted (authenticated for all neigh-
bors) within the NTE message, as shown below.
A
RF
−−→ ∗ : 〈NTE,NTA,MACKAB{.},MACKAC{.}, . . .〉
Every node A combines its own NTA and the received
neighbor tables from its neighbors into a new neighbor table,
NT2A, to be used in the link verification phase. NT2A is
the set that is composed of A itself and its neighbors, plus
the distances between members of this set.
4.3 Link Verification
The link verification consists of the following consistency
tests that node A runs on NT2A. If at any point a link is
discarded, it is ignored in the subsequent steps.
(i) Link Symmetry Test: Any link (U, V ) is discarded
if dUV is different from dV U . This includes links for which
only one measurement is available.
for all U, V ∈ NT2A do
if |dUV − dV U | > ǫsym then
remove links (U,V ) and (V,U) from NT2A
(ii)MaximumRange Test: Links longer than the range
R are discarded.
for all U, V ∈ NT2A do
if dUV > R then
remove links (U, V ) and (V,U) from NT2A
(iii) Quadrilateral Test: For every neighbor B 2, node
A looks for two other nodes C and D that together they
form a 4-clique (i.e., all four are neighbors of each other,
and A knows the distances between all of them). The links
to B, C, andD are declared verified if four of the nodes form
a quadrilateral that is convex. We note that it is possible
that after all the 4-cliques that include (A,B) as a link have
been checked, the link is not verified. In this case, the link
is declared as unverifiable. How to treat unverifiable links
depends on the security policy of the network.
for all B ∈ NT2A s.t. link (A,B) is not verified do
for all C,D ∈ NT2A s.t. {A,B,C,D} is a 4-clique and
∀U,V ∈ {A,B,C,D}, link (U,V ) is not unverifiable do
if {A,B,C,D} is a convex quadrilateral then
mark all links in {A,B,C,D} verified
if link (A,B) is not verified then
mark it as unverifiable
To test if a 4-clique forms a quadrilateral, we check if it
is possible to assign (locally) positions to the nodes such
that no contradiction arises. This can be done as follows:
We assign position (0, 0) to A, and (0, dAB) to B; then we
check if dAB, dBC , dCA form a triangle (i.e., if all three tri-
angle inequalities hold). If not, there is a contradiction.
Otherwise, we assign position (xC , yC) to C, where yC =
(d2AB + d
2
AC − d
2
BC)/(2dAB) and xC = (d
2
AC − y
2
C)
1
2 . Fur-
ther, we check triangle inequalities for dAB , dBD, dDA; if
they hold, there are two possible positions for D: (xD, yD)
and (−xD, yD), where yD = (d
2
AB + d
2
AD − d
2
BD)/(2dAB)
and xD = (d
2
AD − y
2
D)
1
2 . For both positions, we check if the
difference between the measured length dCD and the length
of CD determined by the calculated positions of C and D is
within ǫquad bounds. If it is not in both cases, the distances
do not belong to any quadrilateral. Otherwise, we assign
the matching position to D. Here, ǫquad is computed based
on the empirical distance measurement error.
Given the positions computed in the quadrilateral test
above, to test if the quadrilateral is convex we compute the
product of four cross products (
−→
AB×
−−→
BC)(
−−→
BC×
−−→
CD)(
−−→
CD×
−−→
DA)(
−−→
DA ×
−→
AB). If the product is positive, the quadrilat-
eral is convex, whereas if it is negative the quadrilateral is
concave. We ignore the quadrilateral if any three nodes are
co-linear. This is tested by checking if the absolute value of
any of the above cross products is lower than ǫquad.
5. SCHEME ANALYSIS
We first explain and prove the properties of our ranging
protocol in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. We note that the ranging
protocol itself mitigates a large class of attacks, as demon-
strated by properties (r2) and (r3). Then, in Section 5.3
we prove that our scheme is secure against 2-end wormhole
attacks. Finally, we evaluate its performance in a benign
setting in Section 5.4. For the case of k-end wormhole at-
tacks, we refer the reader to the corresponding technical
report [15].
2The computational complexity of the protocol decreases if
A iterates over its neighbors sorted in the ascending order,
based on their connectivity degree in NT2A.
5.1 Ranging
For this part of the analysis, we assume A and B to be
correct nodes executing the ranging protocol, with A as the
initiator. We will show that the ranging protocol satisfies
the following properties:
(r1) If the protocol terminates successfully and B calcu-
lates dBA, then either dBA ≈ |AB| or dBA ≈ (|AWA|+
|WBB| + τ ), where WA and WB are the relay nodes
close to A and B, respectively, and τ is the distance
corresponding to the additional delay that the adver-
sary might impose on the RNG message).
(r2) The protocol prevents the creation of very long false
links, i.e., links that span more than c
2
× ǫsync.
(r3) The protocol prevents the creation of any false links
by a store-and-forward adversary.
According to the ranging protocol, if B calculates dBA,
the following events have happened (in this order, ti are in
global time):
(1) At time t1, recorded as t
B
REQ, node B has received mes-
sage m1 = 〈REQ,EKAB{N
r
B},H(N
s),MACKAB{.}〉,
with nonce NrB not seen or generated before by B;
(2) At time t2, recorded as t
B
REP , node B has sent message
m2 = 〈REP,N
r
B〉;
(3) At time t3, recorded as t
B
RNG, node B has received a
RNG message m3 = 1||N
s, with Ns neither seen nor
generated before by B;
(4) Node B has received the following message with tAREQ
and tAREP passing the synchronization test:
m4 = 〈ACK,N
s, tAREQ, t
A
REP , t
A
RNG,MACKAB{.}〉
Message m1 is authenticated, and hence can be generated
only by A or B. As B checks that NrB is not self-generated,
node A had to generate m1 and send it at some point in
time t0 < t1, recorded as t
A
REQ by A.
Likewise, m4 can be generated only by A: Node B is
ruled out because it would never generate an ACK message
for a nonce Ns it has not generated itself. Node A would
only send the ACK message for B, if at some time t2.1,
recorded as tAREP , it had received a REP corresponding to
its REQ message that was sent at t0. The only acceptable
REP message is m2; as the nonce N
r
B is fresh and it was
encrypted in m1, only B could have generated this REP
message. Hence, t2 < t2.1 and therefore t0 < t1 < t2 < t2.1.
Thus, we conclude that within an acceptable bound ǫsync at
time t1 the clocks of A and B are equal to t
A
REQ and t
B
REQ,
respectively, if the synchronization test is successful in (4).
From the above, we instantly get (r2): The round trip
propagation delay is equal to (t2.1 − t0)− (t2 − t1) < ǫsync,
which means that if the distance between A and B is longer
than c
2
× ǫsync, the ranging will fail and (A,B) will be dis-
carded. Hence, the attack of a store-and-forward adversary,
which cannot relay a RF message before it entirely receives
it, is aborted in the synchronization phase. This is because
such an attacker introduces an additional delay, equal to the
duration of the exchanged messages, on the synchronization
phase. This delay is well above ǫsync, hence (r3) follows.
When A broadcasts the RNG message m3 at some time
t2.2, it is the first time N
s is sent in clear. Thus, it is not
possible for a relay node, WB, to send m3 before another
relay node, WA, receives m3 sent by A at t2.2. Moreover,
the integrity of m4 is protected, hence B learns t
A
RNG that
is the actual time of sending m3 in A’s clock. As we have
shown that the synchronization phase is secure, B measures
correctly, within an acceptable bound, the difference be-
tween t2.2 and t3, the time at which it received the nonce.
Thus, the distance to A calculated by B is either |AB|, or
|AWA|+ |WBB|+ τ . Hence, (r1) follows.
5.2 Symmetry Test
We show that the delay that is introduced on a relay link
must be the same in both directions for all false links the
attacker creates over that relay link. Otherwise, the attacker
cannot successfully pass the symmetry test for some of the
links over the wormhole. Assume node A is on one side of
the relay link, and nodes B and C are on the other side.
The adversary relays the RNG message, sent by node B
and received (over the wormhole) by node A, with delay τ1,
and relays the RNG message sent by node C, also received
(over the wormhole) by node A, with delay τ2. Node A also
sends a RNG message, which needs to be received by both
B and C if links (A,B) and (A,C) are not to be discarded
by the link symmetry test. To further satisfy the symmetry
test the adversary needs to relay the RNG message of A
with delay τ1 (for symmetry of link (A,B)) and at the same
time with delay τ2 (for symmetry of link (A,C)). Hence,
τ1 = τ2.
5.3 Security against 2-end Wormholes
In this section, we investigate the security of our scheme
against the most commonly considered relay attack: the sin-
gle wormhole, that is a relay attack utilizing two remote
wormhole ends. We assume the wormhole to be remote,
in other words, no valid link exists between correct nodes
on opposite sides of the wormhole (i.e., in vicinity of relay
nodes). Moreover, we limit the analysis to the case where
there is no obstacle in the network.
It is easy to show that an attempt to relay a RNGmessage
between two nodes A and B on the same side of the worm-
hole fails. Indeed, the RNG message sent by A will reach
B directly before the relayed one does. The latter message
will either be ignored, or it will collide with the former. In
neither case the relaying leads to an incorrect distance cal-
culation. Therefore, the adversary can only effectively relay
over the wormhole.
For convenience, we denote the areas on the opposite sides
of the wormhole as the left side of the wormhole and the right
side. To create a false link, the adversary needs to convince
4 nodes that they form a convex quadrilateral. There are
two choices in terms of the number of victim nodes located
on both sides of the wormhole: 2 nodes on each side (2-2),
and 3 nodes on one and 1 node on the other side of the
wormhole (3-1).
(2-2): We show that for this case the adversary is unable
to create any false links.
Denote the nodes on the left side of the wormhole as A,
B and the nodes on the right side of the wormhole as C,
D. Links AB and CD need to be legitimate, whereas links
AC, AD, BC and BD will be created over the wormhole
(see Figure 2(a) for notation). There are two ways in which
a convex quadrilateral can be formed:
1. AB and CD are the opposite sides of a quadrilateral
(Figure 2(b)). In this case:
|AC|+ |BD| = a+ b+ c+ d+ 2t = |AD|+ |BC|
However, in a quadrilateral (of positive volume) the
sum of diagonals’ length (|AD|+ |BC|) is always greater
than the sum of two opposite sides (|AC| + |BD|).
This contradiction implies that the adversary cannot
succeed with this construction.
2. AB and CD are the diagonals of a convex quadrilateral
(Figure 2(c)). Denote X to be the intersection of AB
and CD, with |AX| + |XB| = x and |CX| + |XD| =
y. The triangle inequalities for triangles ACX, BCX,
BDX, DAX in Figure 2(c), added together, give x+
y > a+b+c+d+2t > a+b+c+d. However, the triangle
inequalities for ABW1 and CDW2 in Figure 2(a) give
x + y < a + b + c + d. This (second) contradiction
implies the adversary cannot create a false link in the
2-2 case.
(3-1): For this case, depicted in figure 2(d), the adversary
cannot create any false links, unless t+ d = 0.
First, assume that τ = t + d > 0, and also the ad-
versary can convince the correct nodes that ABCD is a
quadrilateral. This means that AD, BD and CD intersect
in a single point (Figure 2(e)). Then |AD| − |AW1| = τ ,
|BD|− |BW1| = τ and |CD|− |CW1| = τ . This implies that
A, B and C lie on a hyperbola with foci W1 and D, more
precisely on the hyperbola arm closer to W1 (Figure 2(f)).
As this hyperbola arm is concave, 3 points A, B, C cannot
form a convex quadrilateral with point D and hence they
cannot validate false links AD, BD or CD. Therefore, no
false links can be verified.
On the contrary, if t + d = 0, from the perspective of
correct nodes D = W1, and ABCD forms a convex quadri-
lateral. Hence all the false links AD, BD and CD will be
verified. However, the applicability and effectiveness of this
attacks are limited. For the equality to hold, the adversary
must add negligible delay when relaying the message, and
the wormhole end W2 needs to be located in the same place
as node D. Deploying a relay node at a distance less than a
few centimeters from a sensor mote might be difficult con-
sidering their physical appearance. Besides, such a closely
placed relay node would act as an obstacle and would de-
grade communication of the node under attack with its legit-
imate neighbors. Finally, even if the adversary successfully
mounts this attack, all the false links are adjacent to one
node (D) – which might be easily avoided by a node-disjoint
route selection algorithm, e.g. [10].
5.4 Performance Evaluation in Benign Setting
To evaluate the performance of our protocol in a benign
setting, we performed the following simulations. We dis-
tributed from 80 to 480 nodes uniformly in a field mea-
suring 400× 400m, assigning the nodes’ transmission range
to be 100m. We repeated this 1000 times. The unit disk
graph (UDG) model has been used for determining neigh-
bors of nodes. The values of the maximum distance esti-
mation error e (as percentage of maximum range R) reflect,
and even overestimate, the values we obtained in our exper-
iments (Section 6.2). The value of ǫquad is set to 2e.
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Figure 2: 2-end Wormhole, 2-2 and 3-1 attacks.
Circles denote correct nodes, squares denote worm-
hole ends, continuous lines denote real links, and
dashed lines denote links created over the worm-
hole. Rather than the actual distance between W1
and W2, t represents the distance corresponding to
the (non-negative) delay that the adversary chooses
to introduce on link (W1,W2).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Average Node Degree
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
V
er
if
ia
b
le
 L
in
k
s
e=0
e=2
e=4
e=8
Figure 3: Coverage of the protocol. e denotes the
maximum error in distance measurement (as per-
centage of maximum range R).
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Figure 4: Computational complexity of the proto-
col. Three sets of lines, from top to bottom, rep-
resent 95%-percentile, median, and 5%-percentile of
the number of the tested 4-cliques, respectively.
Coverage. Links have to satisfy the convex quadrilateral
test to be verified by our protocol. Yet, even in a benign
setting, some links might not belong to any convex quadri-
lateral, and therefore remain unverifiable. The coverage of
the verification protocol is defined as the percentage of veri-
fiable links. Figure 3 shows the coverage of the protocol vs.
the average degree of nodes (i.e., average number of nodes
that can be ranged by each node). For the networks with
average node degree above 7, the coverage is more than 90%.
We also note that only a negligible fraction of links cannot
be verified due to the distance estimation error.
Communication Complexity A protocol run requires
a node to transmit 3 RF messages (REQ, REP , ACK)
to each of its neighbors, and to broadcast one US (RNG)
and one RF message (NTE) to all neighbors. Hence, the
protocol’s communication complexity is constant per link.
Computational ComplexityTesting whether a 4-clique
is a convex quadrilateral, is by far the most computationally
expensive component of our tests, explained in Section 4.3.
As such, to estimate the computational complexity of the
protocol, we count the“number of tested 4-cliques”per node.
Figure 4 shows the number of tested 4-cliques vs. the aver-
age degree of nodes, for various distance measurement error
values e. As it is shown, the number of tested 4-cliques for
each node is almost linear to the number of its neighbors
(i.e., constant per link).
6. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the implementation of the
ranging protocol on sensor motes and achieved experimen-
tal results. The security tests are not implemented on the
sensor motes. The experimental results confirm the appli-
cability of our protocol.
We used Cricket software v2 as the basis of our project
and TinyOS v1 [6] as the operating system installed on the
Cricket motes. To make the ultrasound signal omnidirec-
tional, we simply mounted a metal cone on top of the motes
to make the signals omnidirectional (similar to [19]).
6.1 Protocol Implementation
Neighbor Discovery. We implemented neighbor discov-
ery as a simple 3-way handshake mechanism. The neighbor
discovery process runs once when a mote is turned on. Be-
cause the key distribution protocol is orthogonal to our work,
we did not implement any key exchange protocol. Instead,
for simplicity, we assigned the cryptographic keys to motes
before the nodes deployment.
Ranging. Ranging is the core component of the proto-
col. After a given node starts ranging, authenticated REQ
messages are sent repeatedly to all of its neighbors every
100 milliseconds. This time interval is large enough to re-
ceive the corresponding REP message from the demanded
neighbor. The starting time of transmission and reception
of all REQ and REP messages are recorded using (32-bit)
microsecond local timers. The accurate reception time of
the messages is computed, after considering the delay intro-
duced by bit alignment and the interrupt handling of radio
frames (as described in [8]).
After finishing the synchronization phase, the initiator
generates a 150µs pulse of 40 KHz ultra-sound using the US
transducer, as the signal for distance measurement. Then,
the ultra-sound nonce, Ns, will be transmitted using a sim-
ple on-off modulation. Every 65 milliseconds, a similar US
pulse is sent if the corresponding bit of the nonce is 1. Oth-
erwise, no signal is transmitted. The interval of sending
successive bits is large enough (65 milliseconds) to avoid the
inter-symbol interference.
All receivers, upon receiving the ultrasound signal store
the arrival time to be used for distance measurement. To
reconstruct the ultra-sound nonce, the receivers repeatedly
listen to the channel. And in each interval if they receive the
signal it is considered as 1. In the end, the assembled nonce
is compared with the expected one (sent in REQ) and the
records are discarded in the case of a discrepancy.
Finally, the initiator node sends the ACK message sep-
arately to all of the neighbors. Upon receiving the ACK
message, nodes are able to calculate the distance and up-
date their neighbor table. To compute the distance, based
on the sound time-of-flight, we also consider the effect of
the reflective cone we use above the ultrasound transducer;
it always adds 10cm to the measured distance.
6.2 Experimental Results
Between 10 and 15 nodes were deployed on the floor in
different configurations in a 4 × 4m room without obsta-
cles in between. We placed nodes in different positions and,
after running the protocol for several runs, results were pro-
cessed off-line. To study to what extent the reflected cone
effects the accuracy of the measurement, we ran the proto-
col also when nodes were located in positions where they
could directly face each other around a circle. For each con-
figurations we let the protocol run up to 70 rounds. Next,
we present the results of the experiments that confirm the
applicability of our protocol.
We investigate the applicability of the protocol in terms
of the time synchronization, distance measurement, and link
symmetry errors, due to the wireless medium irregularity.
Time Synchronization Error. Analyzing the results
of all synchronization data (time-stamps) during the exper-
iments, we derived that 99.55% of them met the constraints
and only 0.45% of the links were discarded because the syn-
chronization error was more than a ǫsync = 5µs threshold.
Distance Measurement Error. Nodes could reliably
range each other for distances up to 4 meters when they
were deployed on the floor with the cones on top of the
transmitter unit. In these conditions, we achieved a maxi-
mum error of 5cm, where errors were positive values. In the
face to face deployment, the maximum transmission range
was 10 meters with maximum error of 3cm.
Link Symmetry Error. For each pair of nodes, A and
B, we computed |dAB − dBA| as the link symmetry error.
This is used to adjust both ǫsym and ǫquad parameters. The
observed symmetry error was below 7cm for 97% of the
cases, and it was below 2cm for 74% of the cases. When
the motes where placed in a circle of 4m diameter, facing
each other, a maximum symmetry error of 2cm was experi-
enced for 97% of the links.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have designed a secure neighbor verification protocol
tailored for wireless sensor networks. To demonstrate its
applicability to WSN, we have provided a proof-of-concept
implementation on existing off-the-shelf hardware (Cricket
motes). We have proved that the protocol is secure against
the classic 2-end wormhole attack. Yet, our scheme is also
effective against more complex relay attacks, as we have
demonstrated with simulations in the associated technical
report [15].
Our scheme can be extended. For example, the scheme
can be relatively easy augmentable to 3D networks by re-
placing the quadrilateral test with its equivalent in the new
setting. Moreover, other distance estimation techniques are
worthy of being implemented as (probably better) alterna-
tives for US-based measurement.
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